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Recent educational journals on both sides of the Atlantic have seen a resurgence of debate about the nature of 
educational research. As a contribution to these debates, this paper draws on theoretical and methodological 
‘thinking tools’ of French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu. Specifically, the paper explores what Jenkins [Jenkins, R. 
(2002). Pierre Bourdieu. London: Routledge and Falmer] refers to as Bourdieu’s ‘‘reflexive epistemological 
pluralism’’ and its implications for research into higher education, with a particular focus on assessment as 
social practice. This particular theoretical and methodological understanding is used to critically reflect on a 
study conducted in 2005 on the impact of a policy on anonymous examination marking which was implemented 
at the University of Cape Town in 2004. The study collected both quantitative data of student examination 
performance pre- and post-policy implementation, as well as interviews with course conveners. The paper 
argues that when viewed interdependently the data offers insight into some of the ‘‘principles of vision and 
division’’ [Bourdieu, P. (1996). The state nobility: Elite schools in the field of power. Cambridge: Polity Press] at 
work in assessors’ judgmentmaking process. The assessors’ deliberations expose ideological tensions between 
the dual challenges of equity and excellence in the context of a historically white liberal university under 
transformation. 
 




Of all the oppositions that artificially divide social science, the most fundamental, and the most ruinous, is the one that is set up 
between subjectivism and objectivism. The very fact that this division constantly reappears in virtually the same form would suffice 
to indicate that the modes of knowledge which it distinguishes are equally indispensable to a science of the social world. (Bourdieu, 
1990, p. 25). 
 
1. Introduction 
Prompted by the United States’ National Research Council’s attempt to set guiding principles for scientifically based education 
research, there has been a flurry of debate in recent educational journals on both sides of the Atlantic in defence of the educational 
research enterprise (Hammersley, 2005; Hodkinson, 2004; Moss, 2005; Nash, 2005). This resurgence of debate is in part a 
response to US governmental attacks on the quality of educational research and moves to prescribe what constitutes 
methodologically appropriate scientific inquiry. For some the contestation focuses on differences of methodology, others on 
differences of epistemology, even ontology. Moss (2005) argues that the debate is not about methods but about the aims of social 
science research given its focus on social practice. This paper is seen as a contribution to these on-going debates. 
 
The past few decades have seen a ‘social turn’ in theories of teaching, learning and assessment [as is evidenced in this special 
dition]. In contrast to the psychometric approach which has dominated assessment research and practice, there has been a rowing 
interest in assessment as a social practice (Broadfoot, 1996; Filer, 2000; Gipps, 1999; Shay, 2004, 2005). What does such an 
emphasis on practice mean, however, and what are the implications for researching assessment as practice? An interest in practice 
has two dimensions to it. Firstly, the interest is in what people do in their daily activities. These doings are located in space and time, 
and cannot therefore be understood outside of the social, cultural, economic and political contexts in which they occurs (Gipps, 
1999). Secondly, the notion of ‘practice’ also suggests that these doings are habitual; they have hardened into a kind of relative 
permanency (Chouliariki & Fairclough, 1999). This relative permanency means that people engage in practices purposefully, but not 
always consciously so. 
 
Thus an interest in assessment as social practice is an interest in the daily acts of judgment that teachers/academics perform. 
These classification acts are constituted through a complex set of disciplinary, departmental and institutional values embedded in 
rules and procedures. This presents a challenge for researchers of these social practices. In exploring assessors’ judgment-making 
processes it emerged that the classificatory frameworks which inform these judgments are often deeply internalized: they are the 
outcome of being at home in a particular ‘field’ (Shay, 2005). Assessors may not be fully conscious of their ways of viewing and 
classifying the world, and thus unable to fully articulate their judgment-making processes. This is a challenge for the researcher. At 
the same time, part of being human is to be reflexive, that is, we are continually attempting to make sense of what we do and why 
we do it. These sense-makings are part of the doing and therefore central to understanding the social practice. In addition to these 
challenges the researcher has to account for his or her own sense-making. These methodological challenges are central to 
researching social practice and central to the concerns of this paper. 
 
My particular theoretical understanding of social practice has been heavily influenced by French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu. Taking 
his lead, the analytical focus is not on individual agents, though the role of agents within practice is crucial. Nor is it on structures, 
though the macro social conditions which enable practice are equally crucial. A social practice perspective is focused on the 
relationships between the acts of agents within practices (including their understandings of these acts) and the broader social 
conditions which constitute these practices, with a particular interest in their codetermination. Bourdieu refers to this as ‘‘thinking 






sense of practice in a particular social, historical, institutional context. The emphasis on the particularity of practice is not antithetical 
to a search for the more general or the universal. The goal of such research is ‘‘to grasp the particularity within the generality and 
the generality within the particularity’’ (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p. 75) and to uncover ‘‘the universal buried deep within the most 
particular’’ (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p. 44). 
 
As evidenced in the opening quote, one of the fundamental goals of Bourdieu’s work is to straddle some of the ‘‘false antinomies’’ 
which have held the social sciences captive, antinomies between subject and object, structure and agency, subjectivism and 
objectivism (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p. 10). These antinomies are refuted in favour of a ‘‘double reality of social world’’ 
(Bourdieu &Wacquant, 1992, p. 11) – the mutually constituted relationship between structure and agency. However, Bourdieu’s 
project of finding a middle way or third path between the thesis and antithesis of objectivism and subjectivism is not particularly 
unique. In the aftermath of postmodernism, much of the contemporary preoccupation of social theory in the mid to late 1900s has 
been the search for a middle ground (Berstein, 1983). What distinguishes Bourdieu’s work is his rigorous pursuit of the inseparability 
of theory from method (Bourdieu &Wacquant, 1992). His theory of social practice necessitates a particular methodological 
approach: the reflexive epistemological pluralism referred to above. If we accept the double reality of social practice, then the 
analysis of social practice requires a ‘‘double reading’’ (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p. 7), an epistemic pluralism. Reflexive 
epistemological pluralism refers to Bourdieu’s insistence on an analytical turn on ourselves as researchers and our research 
practices – the necessity of critically reflecting on how we know what we know as a crucial part of the analytical process. 
 
Out of this commitment, throughout his career Bourdieu repeatedly returned to the same data. In this spirit this paper is an attempt 
at such a reflexive turn. In the first part of the paper I give a brief overview of a study conducted on the impact of a policy on 
anonymous examination at the University Cape Town: the background, the research questions and design and key findings.1 In the 
second part of the paper I return to this study with an explicit Bourdieu ‘theory as method’ lens for a more close-up view of the data 
collected, including my own interests as analyst. 
 
2. The impact of anonymous marking: an institutional reading 
In 2003 the University of Cape Town approved an anonymous examination policy which required the student name to be concealed 
from the marker. The policy was a response to students’ concerns in the early 1990s – a politically turbulent time in South Africa’s 
history – about the potential for racial or gender discrimination in the marking of examinations. The policy was approved and 
implemented in 2004 with the stated intention of ‘‘minimizing the possibility that irrelevant inferences be subconsciously used to 
discriminate for or against students, in particular inferences based on gender, race and any other kind of information which can be 
made on the basis of a student’s name’’ (Proposal to the Examination and Assessment Committee 1/9/2003). The wording of this 
intention signals two important issues in the debate around this policy. The first issue was the recognition that discrimination could 
be negative or positive. The former refers to a situation where marks are withheld on the basis of information irrelevant to student 
performance such as race or gender. The latter refers to a situation where inferences about student identity may result in a more 
generous assessment (also referred to as sympathetic marking). The second issue was the recognition that such a policy could not 
ensure total anonymity; the intention was to minimize subconscious inferences. This was in part a result of the limitations of UCT’s 
method of implementation,2 as well as the recognition that no policy could prevent intentional discrimination for or against students.  
 
In the first year of implementing the policy a course convener from a large undergraduate course conducted a comparison of the 
examination performance before and after the policy. The findings were that there was a significant decrease from 62% to 55% in 
the mean examination scores between the two years, and that the distribution of scores had widened significantly from a range of 
56–67% in 2003 to 46–64% in 2004. This resulted in the exam failure rate increasing from 7% in the year before the policy 
implementation to 33% after implementation. He argued that these lower exam results and wider distribution patterns were a result 
of the shift to anonymous marking since all else in the course had remained stable across the years – the teaching staff, the course 
content, the examination, as well as the students’ coursework marks. In terms of the reasons why the anonymous marking resulted 
in lower mean marks and wider distributions he speculated: 
 
The effect on markers. . . appears to have been shown through their awarding of a greater range of marks, particularly for 
weaker scripts. This may be because the anonymity of the exam liberated markers from a previously-held positive bias in 
favour of second-language speakers. Given that the majority of second-language English speakers are previously (and 
therefore probably currently) disadvantaged, markers may previously have been inclined to give incomprehensible or 
poorly-worded answers the benefit of the doubt to a greater than desirable extent, because one knew (or rather, could 
check) that the student was previously disadvantaged. With our current system of anonymous marking, it may therefore 
be the case that answers are treated on their merits, and consequently more fairly. (Report to the Head of Department 
written by the course convener, 13 September 2004). 
 
This convener’s account seemed to point to evidence of sympathetic marking in examination marking prior to the implementation of 
the policy, and thus endorsed the need for the policy. 
 
In 2005 a study of the impact of the policy on student performance was conducted. The key questions were to establish whether 
there were any significant differences in patterns of examination performance pre- and post-policy, and to explore what the markers 
perceived to be the reasons for these differences (or lack of differences). Five undergraduate courses were selected, one from each 
of UCT’s faculties (excluding UCT’s Law Faculty where anonymous marking had been in place for some time). The courses were 
selected on the basis of a range of variables, the primary concern being curriculum stability during the period of study. Another key 
variable was selecting courses where the exam required some degree of interpretive work on the part of the assessor (e.g. essays). 
The study collected both quantitative and qualitative data. The quantitative data consisted of student examination performance two 
years pre- and post-policy from each of the five courses. The data were disaggregated by population group,3 educational 







Analysis of the quantitative data revealed: Firstly, across all five courses and across all four years, there was a consistent pattern of 
performance differentiated by population group, educational background, language and gender. Specifically, across all the years 
and across all the courses under study there was a pattern of students classified ‘white’ outperforming student from other population 
groups, speakers of English as a first language outperforming speakers of English as an additional language, students from prior 
backgrounds of historically advantaged schooling outperforming students from prior backgrounds of historically disadvantaged 
schooling, and females outperforming males. Secondly, across all five courses, the differentiated performance patterns were 
consistent pre- and post-study. In other words, the patterns of differentiated performance between, for example, ‘white’ students and 
‘black’ students did not change after the policy implementation. 
 
Given the history of racial discrimination in South Africa and the students’ particular concerns about the potential for such 
discrimination in examination marking, the primary institutional interest of the study was to establish whether there was any 
evidence of negative discrimination prior to the implementation of the policy. The argument would be that if there had been 
significant levels of discrimination, and if the implementation of the policy succeeded in masking these aspects of student identity, 
the findings should reveal changed performance for certain categories of students following the policy implementation (for example, 
one might expect Black African students to perform better). The fact that there were no changes in performance patterns pointed to 
no evidence for positive or negative discrimination prior to the implementation of the policy. This institutional reading of the data 
suggested that the students’ concerns about racial discrimination were unfounded. 
 
  The findings were presented to Senate subcommittee noting that there was no conclusive evidence for discriminatory marking on 
examinations. These findings were consistent with the course convener’s speculation noted above. It was recommended however 
that for political reasons the policy be retained. As far as the institution’s interests in the study were concerned, this was the end of 
the story. However my own interests as a researcher of social practices led me to return to the data – to stand back and interrogate 
my acts of ‘objectification’ on behalf of the institution’s interests. What emerged from this reflexive move was the possibility of an 
alternative reading of the data. This alternative account had less to say about the impact of anonymous marking and more to say 
about how assessors position themselves within a particular set of social realities. 
 
3. An alternative reading 
My theoretical understanding of assessment as a socially-situated interpretive act meant that I brought a particular set of interests to 
both the policy formulation and the follow-up study. An interpretive approach assumes discrimination (or ‘prejudice’ as Gadamer 
refers to it6) to be an unavoidable dimension of the judgment-making process. This policy implementation became an opportunity to 
explore this judgment-making process. Thus I was particularly attuned during the interviews to assessors’ accounts of their 
deliberations over student performance particularly at the borderlines of pass and fail. I probed further into what emerged as an 
alternative interpretation of the unchanged performance patterns (noted above in the findings). The reason why the student 
performance patterns were consistent, these assessors argued, is because UCT does not in fact have anonymous marking. 
Irrespective of whether the student’s name is on the script or not, markers make inferences about identity and these inferences 
inevitably influence judgments. Thus in contrast to the quantitative account which suggested no evidence of discrimination, these 
accounts laid bare markers’ discriminatory judgment marking processes. These seemingly contradictory accounts led me to re-
consider these two different data sets from a Bourdieu-ian perspective. 
 
Drawing on his ‘thinking tools’ I want to propose that these different accounts represent what Bourdieu refers to as different ‘modes 
of knowledge’ each with its vantage points on social practice. Making sense of the logic of social practice necessitates an epistemic 
pluralism – the ‘view from above’ and the ‘view from below’ (Jenkins, 2002, p. 49). I explore these different modes of knowledge for 
what they each have to offer as well as their limitations. Starting with the quantitative data, these data provide a synoptic view of 
student performance in the form of mean scores and distributions. Furthermore the quantitative data provide comparisons of these 
mean scores and distributions over a period of time, between selected groups, and across different kinds of test items. These 
patterns represent a ‘reality’ that any particular subject (course convener, tutor, student) would not necessarily be aware of from the 
confines of their particular experience, unless they had done a similar kind of analysis (such as the course convener reported on 
above). In this sense (and this is Bourdieu’s sense) these patterns represent an objective description of reality; they are independent 
from the subjects who are responsible for their construction. These subjects may be responsible for the 2005 marks but they are not 
responsible for previous years, and they are not responsible for the other four courses. This is the ‘view from above’ (Jenkins, 2002). 
 
I noted earlier that the purpose of the analysis was to expose underlying principles which explain or make sense of practices in a 
particular social, historical, and institutional context. Such explanations for social practice reject mechanical or automatic causal 
links between ‘variables’, for example, the variable of ‘school background’ and examination performance. Scott (in Nash, 2005) 
argues that these ‘variables’ are not real but proxies for real variables. They are proxies for a ‘‘specific lived process’’ (p. 191). 
Following this argument, the variable of ‘school background’ in this data is a proxy for a whole set of conditions which influence 
examination performance. These conditions include, depending on which school background, differentiated levels of resources, 
quality of teachers, access to textbooks etc.. . . This might seem an obvious point to a South African reader. The issue here is the 
epistemological status of the data. It is a snapshot of differentiated performance under differentiated social conditions. Set alongside 
other snapshots7 what emerges is a socially and politically constructed reality as one of the legacies of apartheid education. These 
conditions from the past, tenaciously still present, influence student performance – not only in the narrow confines of the exam but in 
the classroom, the tutorials, the corridors – influencing who speaks and who does not speak in tutorials, who comes for help and 
who does not, as well as who passes and who fails. Thus an alternative reading of the consistent pattern of student performance is 
that irrespective of the policy the social conditions instituted by apartheid education remain fixed, not for all time but for the present 
and some would argue for the foreseeable future. 
 
I now turn to the qualitative data, that is, the accounts which emerged through the interviews. As noted above, one of the course 
conveners initially argued for a causal relationship between the implementation of the anonymous examination policy and the 
decreased performance. His explanation for the decreased marks was that the policy had minimized sympathetic marking. He 






extenuating circumstances – ‘‘a poor answer now gets a low mark’’. In a follow-up interview he elaborated on his reasoning: ‘‘If you 
know the race of the student and. . . you make an assumption about the quality of their schooling that in general (it) was better than 
the majority of black students. . . one can almost say that there’s a feeling that it’s their (white students’) fault. (It’s) the students’ 
fault if they haven’t answered the question well, because they haven’t worked hard enough or they haven’t paid attention or 
whatever it might be. Whereas if you find that with a student that you know is a black student, it’s not that easy to make that 
judgment. You think well, they were a victim of bad schooling and that principle of charity would come in, where you would give 
them the benefit of the doubt.’’ 
 
This practice of ‘sympathetic marking’ came up in all the interviews. These are instances where a name, a student number or the 
actual performance evokes in the marker a stereotype of a ‘disadvantaged’ student which may generate sympathy on the part of the 
marker, particularly if the student’s performance is on the pass/fail borderline. One convener admitted, ‘‘You note the name and 
think the language isn’t going to be good. And with that you’d have an element of, you know, how would I do in a second 
language?... Here’s somebody carrying two bags of cement on their shoulders, not one. . .And so you go a bit easy. . .. If it’s 
obvious to me that a student is not a first language English speaker and there’s really something I’m struggling to understand, I 
would tend to give them the benefit of the doubt. I would sort of say to myself, ‘Could he mean that?’’’ These data offer us a ‘view 
from below’. These are assessors’ accounts of deliberations on the borderlines. What is the contribution of these data to an 
understanding of assessment as a social practice? If we apply Bourdieu’s relational thinking tools, the quantitative performance 
data, as argued above, is a representation of an objective reality of the field of higher education in South Africa. This is ‘‘objectivity 
of the first order’’ constituted by the distribution of material resources (capital) as a result of the legacy of apartheid. This reality in 
turn constitutes an ‘‘objectivity of the second order’’ that is, markers’ systems of classification – the ‘‘symbolic templates for the 
practical activities – conduct, thoughts, feelings, and judgments – of social agents’’ (Bourdieu &Wacquant, 1992, p. 7). In Bourdieu’s 
terms these subjective accounts are the ‘‘internalization of externality’’ (Bourdieu, 1996, p. 29). But not all agents will internalize in 
the same way. All of those interviewed in this study were white. One can imagine other sorts of responses, such as those indicated 
in the data from a study conducted by Jawitz (2006) who is exploring how new academic staff in a South African university learn to 
judge student performance. He gives an account of a new black staff member who consciously adjusts his own marks downwards in 
response to his perception of white colleagues’ sympathetic marking of black students. Thus within the objective reality of the field 
there is a range of possible responses depending on agents’ trajectories into and within the field. 
 
To summarize, these views from above and below provide different vantage points on social practice. The synoptic view of 
performance patterns across courses, across time and across different groups reduces and simplifies complex phenomenon into 
patterns which are useful for understanding social practice. It reminds us that there is a lot more happening in practice than what 
individuals can account for. However the danger of this objectivist point of view is the seductive slip from the data as a model (or 
representation) of reality to the data as reality itself. Bourdieu refers to as the ‘synoptic illusion’ (Jenkins, 2002). However useful the 
performance patterns may be we must not lose sight of their constructedness. This constructedness is best illustrated in the 
population group variables of ‘White’, ‘Black’, ‘Coloured’, ‘Indian’ – labels of classification with an explicit political and social history 
which are increasingly problematic.  
 
The view from below gives us access to agents’ reflexivities, their sense-making in context. We gain insight into ‘‘the part that 
mundane knowledge, subjective meaning, and practical competency play in the continual production of society’’ (Bourdieu & 
Wacquant, 1992, p. 9). This view also has its limitations. Bourdieu raises a number of critiques of these ‘native interpretations’ many 
of which are familiar to qualitative researchers sensitive to the constructedness of, for example, interview data. Firstly, we note that 
interviewees’ accounts are not descriptions of practice but explanations of practice. This is a crucial distinction. Epistemologically, 
informants’ accounts have an already semi-theorized status. For example, the course convener’s account of the relationship 
between the implementation of the policy and the examination performance (noted above) is not a description of what actually 
happened but rather his own attempts to make sense of what happened. Grenfell and James (2004) argue that, rather than taking 
what people say at face value, we must seek to understand people in terms of their location among a series of possible social 
positions. 
 
Secondly, sociolinguists remind us that people are always doing things with language. Halliday and Hasan (1985) distinguish 
between the ideational and relational functions of language. The former refers to people using language to impart information. The 
latter refers to the way people use, for example interviews, to secure approval, protect themselves or others, set the record straight, 
distance or align themselves with particular agendas. Thus a relevant question might be, why are interviewees telling me about their 
sympathy for historically disadvantaged students? The answer to this question sheds further light on the social-situatedness of 
assessment. Thirdly, the data is doubly constructed: there is the account of the practice being told by the interviewee and there is 
the account of the practice being heard and interpreted by the researcher. I noted earlier how the institution’s interests led to one 
reading of the data and my own theoretical interests led to another. There is no doubt that my interest in assessment as a social 
practice influenced what I found ‘‘interesting’’. As Bourdieu notes ‘‘. . .to say we are interested in a problem is a euphemistic way of 
naming the fundamental fact that we have vital stakes in our scientific productions. . .’’ (quoted in Grenfell & James, 2004, p. 515). 
 
Thus the interdependence of these two representations of reality – the objective and the subjective – exposes some of the 
complexity of the judgment-making process. Privileging either reality at the expense of the other would not only result in a partial 
account but a misleading one. These views are ‘‘equally indispensable’’ to an understanding of assessment as social practice (see 
opening quote). I would like to suggest that, viewed in relation to each other, these data offer insight into some of the ‘‘principles of 
vision and division’’ (Bourdieu, 1996, p. 265) at work in this judgment-making process in a particular social–historical context. These 
assessors’ deliberations expose ideological tensions between the dual challenges of equity and excellence in the context of a 
historically white liberal university under transformation, that is, the imperative to redress past inequalities while maintaining 
standards of excellence (whatever that might mean). In their attempt to resolve these tensions agents’ responses will vary 
depending on their own trajectories into and within the field, but the range of admissible responses is restricted. It comes as no 






discrimination is not admissible. In contrast positive discrimination is admissible for some, but as Jawitz’s data indicates (noted 
above) it is problematic for others.   
 
4. Conclusion 
At the beginning of this paper, I noted the flurry of debate prompted by the US governmental attacks on the quality of educational 
research and the moves to prescribe what constitutes methodologically appropriate scientific inquiry. Like Moss (2005) I believe 
Bourdieu has much to offer in challenging the epistemic polarization which characterizes much of the debate, that is, the privileging 
of one mode of knowledge as more ‘scientific’ or more ‘valid’ than the other. If we accept Bourdieu’s ‘logic’ of social practice it 
requires a ‘‘double-focused analytical lens’’ (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p. 7), that is, an analysis of the regularities of the field and 
an analysis of agents’ internalizations of these regularities through their reflexive deliberations and actions. This is consistent with 
critical realist Nash (2005) who argues, ‘‘The best accounts of social processes are thus multilayered, and in their attempt to reflect 
the complexity of the world offer narratives that integrate rather than disintegrate. . .’’ (p. 191). It could be argued that no sub-field of 
education has been more disintegrated than that of assessment where research has been dominated by psychometric 
preoccupations for classification with little attention to the epistemological status of these classificatory systems. Moss (1996) 
argues for a dialectic between ‘the ontextualized understanding of local meanings and the distancing analysis of regularities’ (p. 22). 
To the extent that the educational research debate represents genuine dialogue, let us hope that one of its outcomes will be such a 
dialectic understanding of the social practices we seek to understand. 
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